Kuhn,naturalism,and the positivist legacy Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science (2004)
Abstract
I defend against criticism the following claims concerning Thomas Kuhn: (i) there
is a
strong naturalist streak in The structure of scientific revolutions,whereby Kuhn
used the
results of a posteriori enquiry in addressing philosophical questions; (ii) as
Kuhn’s career as
a philosopher of science developed he tended to drop the naturalistic elements
and to replace
them with more traditionally philosophical, a priori approaches; (iii) at the
same time there
is a significant residue of positivist thought in Kuhn,which Kuhn did not recognise
as such;
(iv) the naturalistic elements referred to in (i) are the most original and fruitful
elements of
Kuhn’s thinking; (v) the positivistic elements referred to in (iii) vitiated
his thought and
acted as factors in preventing Kuhn from developing the naturalistic elements
and from following
the path taken by much subsequent philosophy of science. Preston presents an alternative
reading of Kuhn which emphasizes the Wittgensteinian elements in Kuhn. I argue
that this alternative view is,descriptively,poorly supported by the textual evidence
and the
facts of the history of philosophy of science in the twentieth century. I provide
some defence
of the naturalistic approach and related themes.
Keywords: Kuhn; Naturalism; Positivism; Preston